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CRIMINAL LAw-CoMFENTS BY
THE JUDGE ON THE EVIDENCE-ARGU-
MENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS. - [New
York] The defendant was convicted
of manslaughter in the second de-
gree, for having stabbed his wife
with a bread knife while they were
alone in their apartment. The de-
fense was that she had committed
suicide, the defendant testifying that
he had not touched her but that she
had stabbed herself while his back
was turned. The judge instructed the
jury that there was no evidence to
support the defense of suicide and
further summed up all the evidence
relied on by the prosecution, ignor-
ing or disparaging the testimony for
the defense. Held: on appeal, re-
versed. The instructions were pre-
judicial to the defendant and this
was not remedied by the final words
of the judge informing the jury that
they were the judges of the facts
and were not to be influenced by the
court's remarks: People v. Thomas
(1934) 269 N. Y. Supp. 145.
The only limitations which the
common law imposed on the trial
judge in either a civil or criminal
case, in the matter of expressing
his opinion with reference to the
merits of the case, were that he
should make it clear to the jury that
they were not bound by his opinion
and that the decision upon the facts
was exclusively for them: Jessner
v. State (1930) 202 Wis. 184, 231
N. W. 634. That has remained the
rule in England down to the present
time: Hale "History of the Com-
mon Law of England" (4th ed.,
1792) p. 291; People v. O'Donnell
(1917) 12 Cr. Ap. Rep. 219. As
part of the common law system of
jury trial, the rule thus prevailed in
the early American courts also, but
today that practice obtains in only
ten jurisdictions in this country, in-
cluding the federal courts: (Conn.,
Minn., N. Y., N. J., Ohio, Penn.,
R. I., Utah, Vt., N. H.) Hunter v.
United States (1925) 267 U. S. 597,
45 S. Ct. 352; State v. Cianflone
(1923) 98 Conn. 454, 120 Atl. 347;
State v. Dragon (1923) 99 N. J.
Law 144, 122 Atl. 878; Common-
wealth v. Nofus (1931) 303 Pa. 418,
154 Atl. 485; United States v.
Frankel (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) 65 F.
(2d) 285. In most jurisdictions it
is now considered an invasion of the
province of the jury for the court
to express any opinion as to the
weight of the evidence. This change
has been brought about almost en-
tirely by organic and statutory pro-
visions (Statutes are found in: Ala.,
Fla., Ga., Ill., Iowa, La., Me., Mass.,
Miss., N. D., Ore., Texas, Mich., N.
M., S. D.; while constitutional pro-
visions are found in: Ark., Cal.,
Nevada, N. C., Tenn., Wash., S. C.,
Del.), though in some states it ap-
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pears to have been the result of mis-
interpretation of the common law
or judicial adoption of legislation
in other states made necessary by
evils which crept into the system
(Ind., Kan., Ky., Neb., Mo., Mont.,
Md., Va., W. Va., Colo., Ohio,
Okla.).
General Rule Against Comments
on the Evidence: The tendency of
some judges to impose their views
on the jury and of juries to shirk
the responsibility of deciding the
issues for themselves had given
cause for feai that the constitutional
right of jury trial might be vitiated,
and the pendulum swung the other
way, impelled by those who watched
jealously for any attempt to break
down the line between the functions
of judge and jury. For excellent
comment on the history of this de-
velopment see note in (1928) 12
Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 76. The rule is
interpreted with varying degrees of
strictness in different states, but its
enforcement is generally very
stringent: Johnson v. State (1913)
8 Ala. App. 207, 62 So. 328; Havill
v. State (1912) 7 Okla. Cr. 22, 121
Pac. 794; State v. Green (1908) 303
Utah 497, 94 Pac. 987; State v.
Hundley (1870) 46 Mo. 414; but see
Durant v. Burt (1867) 98 Mass. 161;
Cicero v. State (1875) 54 Ga. 157;
State v. Elkins (1876) 63 Mo. 159.
The statement of it is usually to the
effect that the judge may not in his
charge comment on the evidence or
express any opinion with regard to
matters of fact: Note (1921) 10
A. L. R. 1116, though in some of
these jurisdictions summing up is
still allowed, and the judge may state
or recapitulate the evidence so long
as he is careful to remain absolutely
neutral: State v. Dawkins (1890)
32 S. C. 17, 10 S. E. 772; People v.
Christenson (1890) 85 Cal. 568, 21
Pac. 888; Commonwealth v. Berry
(1810) 9 Allen (Mass.) 276. Any
remarks by the judge during the
course of the trial which indicate
an opinion on the merits of the case
are usually considered as within the
rule or its logically necessary corol-
lary, and in some states the statute
expressly includes such remarks in
its inhibition: Note, A. L. R., supra.
(In Texas, the statute reads, "...
nor shall he at any stage of the pro-
ceedings previous to the return of
the verdict make any remarks cal-
culated to convey to the jury his
opinion of the case.")
Common Law Rule: New York is
a common law jurisdiction, and it
has been stated that the only limi-
tation to the privilege allowing the
judge to express his opinions on the
weight of the evidence was that the
ultimate decision of the facts must
be left to the jury. That limitation is
of greater significance than mere
statement would indicate. For the
fundamental concept of the Anglo-
American system of jury trial lies
in the division of labor between the
judge and jury, and even when the
judge is permitted to give the jury
the benefit of his greater experience
and understanding, any invasion by
him of the jury's function is con-
demned, the difference being in the
notion of the line dividing their re-
spective functions. So in the com-
mon law jurisdictions like New York
great care must be taken that the
jury are not misled into the belief
that they are bound by the judge's
views of the evidence, and the opin-
ion of the judge must be offered
only as such and to be leaned on
only in time of difficulty: Nudd v.
Burrows (1875) 91 U. S. 439; N. Y.
Fire Insurance Co. v. Walden (1815).
12 Johns (New York) 519; Carney
v. United States (C. C. A. 9th, 1924)
295 Fed. 606. It has been held in
England that a summing up, in effect
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recommending a verdict of guilty,
which does not adequately put the
prisoner's case before the jury is
reason for quashing a conviction:
Rex v. O'Donnell (1917) 12 Cr. Ap.
Rep. 219; Rex v. Beeby (1911) 6 Cr.
Ap. Rep. 138, for the judge in sum-
ming up is bound to put the defense,
however weak, to the jury: Rex v.
Diminck (1909) 26 I. L. R. 74, 3
Cr. Ap. Rep. 77. During the trial
in the instant case the court in col-
loquy with counsel said that there
was no evidence of suicide and later
charged the jury that "Every killing
is a homicide and this killing was
either manslaughter in the first de-
gree or in the second degree, or else
it was suicide on the part of the de-
ceased, according to the allegations
of counsel and the theory of the de-
fense," and that "It is suggested by
the defendant's counsel and by the
defendant that this woman must
have killed herself." These instruc-
tions taken with the foregoing re-
mark tended to weaken the suicide
defense. The court completely ig-
nored the testimony of the medical
examiner that a previous injury to
the deceased's wrist had not weak-
ened it so as to make self-infliction
of the death wound unlikely and
charged the jury, "Now, in consider-
ing that testimony there are two
things which you should dwell upon.
The first is the amount of force nec-
essary to drive a knife that far into
a human being; and secondly, on the
question of suicide, is it or is it not
likely that a woman who meant to
kill herself would stab herself in
that particular place? That is a
question that seems to me of great
importance." The judge further
called to the attention oi the jury
the unlikelihood of falsehood on the
part of the medical examiner, a paid
officer of the state, and went on to
make it clear that a man on trial in
the position of the defendant would
have no regard for truth if his life
or freedom were at stake. Of these
remarks and instructions the appel-
late court said, "The statements are
not made in the form of a mere nar-
rative of the claims made by the
prosecution in connection with the
testimony, but are advanced as per-
sonal arguments of the court con-
cerning the significance which
should be attached to various parts
of the testimony contained in the
record. They amount in effect to
an animated argument in support of
the people's claim." The test ap-
pears to be in fact if not in theory
whether the instructions complained
of were such as actually influence
the jury prejudicially. Here the in-
structions were "advanced as per-
sonal arguments of the court" and
while the mere fact that they were
argumentative in form will not usu-
ally operate a reversal, argumenta-
tive instructions are always con-
demned as rendering more uncertain
a fair and just disposition of the
rause and will always constitute re-
versible error when otherwise vi-
cious and unfair: Baldwin v. State
(1896) 111 Ala. 11, 20 So. 528;
Jones v. State (1880) 65 Ga. 621;
Weare v. United States (C. C. A.
8th, 1924) 1 F. (2d) 617; Duigman
v. State (1880) 48 Wis. 485, 4 N. W.
668; McAllister v. State (1913) 67
Ore. 480, 136 Pac. 354.
To the present day, the rule has
been the subject of much contro-
versy. It has been sought on several
occasions to limit even the federal
judiciary in this regard: Osborne,
"Some Problems of Procedural Re-
form" (1921) 7 A. B. A. J. 249 and
editorial comment on "Whittling
Away at Federal Tribunals" (1928)
14 A. B. A. J. 200. At the same
time there have been attempts to
free state judges of the restrictions
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already imposed. In Illinois, a stat-
ute providing that the court in
charging the jury shall only instruct
as to the law of the case (Ill. Rev.
Stat., Cahill 1929, c. 110, §72) was
attacked as repugnant to the con-
stitutional guarantee that "the right
of trial by jury as heretofore en-
joyed shall remain inviolate": Peo-
ple v. Kelly (1931) 347 II1. 221, 179
N. E. 898. The court upheld the
statute on the ground that since the
judge's comments on the evidence
were not subject to the demand of
the defendant as a matter of right
at common law, the privilege was
not an essential element of the com-
mon law system and therefore was
not protected by the constitutional
provision. But a strong dissent by
DeYoung concurred in by Dunn
argued that the right of the defend-
ant that the judge should not be
hampered as under the statute was
inviolate: Note (1932) 23 J. Crim.
Law 1034. While it is not difficult
to see the necessity for preventing
unbridled partiality in the judge, it
is also apparent in the light of pres-
ent day restrictions on him that the
reaction has made almost as much a
mockery of jury trial as could the
abuse have done: Cartwright,
"Present But Taking No Part"
(1915) 10 I11. L. Rev. 537. With
the elaborate system of appellate
courts that exists in this country,
there would probably be small
chance for abuse of the privilege
by the trial judges with correction
so readily forthcoming as in the in-
stant case, and it would seem that
if a really impartial trial is desired
and not merely one favoring the
accused at every point, the common
law rule is likely to secure it.
ROBERT N. BURCHMORE.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEALED VERDICT
- DOUBLE JEOPARDY. - [Kansas]
Richard E. Brown was tried by a
jury on an information containing
two counts, one of which charged
him with the commission of the crime
of rape within two years last prior
to May 25, 1933. After evidence was
offered by the state as to numerous
acts constituting the crime charged,
on the defendant's motion, the state
elected to rely for conviction upon
acts on or about March 18, 1932.
Upon the conclusion of the trial, the
jury was informed that they should
render a sealed verdict to the bail-
iff, and that they might separate, go
home, and return to court the next
morning. The next day the court
convened with all the jurors present
except one, and reported that they
had reached a verdict the previous
day, and had sealed and delivered
it in accordance with the court's in-
structions. The defendant stated his
willingness to waive the presence ot
the absent juror, who was ill, but
the court continued the case until
the following Friday. On Friday,
all the jurors were present, but re-
ported that they were not agreed.
Upon being sent back for further
consideration, and again failing to
reach an agreement, the court dis-
charged the jury. The cause was
then continued to the next term, the
sealed verdict being preserved in the
hands of the clerk. Following this,
the defendant was rearrested on a
warrant charging statutory rape on
the same person named in the above
proceedings on or about five desig-
nated days all prior to May 25, 1933,
one of them being March 18, 193Z
After a preliminary hearing the de-
fendant was bound over for trial.
Defendant instituted an original pro-
ceeding in habeas corpus in the Kan-
sas Supreme Court, seeking his re-
lease from custody under the first
indictment on the ground that the
court erred in refusing to allow him
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to waive the presence of one juror
and that the jury may not alter a
verdict once arrived at and sealed.
He further sought his release under
the second charge on grounds of
double jeopardy. Held: writ of
habeas corpus allowed as to the com-
mitment under which petitioner was
held for a new trial by reason of
the failure of the court to receive
the verdict following the trial com-
menced on November 23, 1933, and
writ of habeas corpus denied as to
the commitment on which the de-
fendant is held, having been bound
over to the district court on January
23, 1934: Ex parte Brown (1934)
139 Kan. 614, 32 P. (2d) 507.
The first question to arise in the
instant case involves the validity of
a verdict reached by a full jury, but
returned into court by a partial jury.
The court seems to follow the rea-
soning of Patton v. United States
(1930) 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253,
in which it was held that the com-
stitutional right of one on trial for
crime to a jury of twelve persons
may be waived, either altogether, or
by consenting to a trial by a less
number than twelve. This had the
effect of overruling the previous
holding of the Kansas court in State
V. Simons (1900) 61 Kan. 752, 60
Pac. 1052, that such an agreement
by the defendant to waive a full
jury would be ineffectual to bind
him. There is no specific provision
in the Kansas statutes for a sealed
verdict, and there is no previous
case, where under similar circum-
stances the force and effect of a
sealed verdict has been considered.
However, an early Kansas case,
Bishop v. Mugler (1885) 33 Kan.
145, 5 Pac. 756, held that a sealed
verdict should be presented by a
full jury in open court, so that the
parties may avail themselves of the
right of polling the jury. and until
the verdict is regularly received and
filed, it is without force or validity.
But this was a civil case, and the
court, in the instant case, makes a
very sensible distinction between
civil and criminal cases in this re-
spect: "In a civil case, the parties
are on a parity; in a criminal case,
the defendant is hedged about with
constitutional and statutory protec-
tion which the state does not enjoy.
The defendant is entitled to demand
strict compliance with every require-
ment in his favor, but . . . he has
power to waive at least some of
those requirements." The verdict
may be returned in the absence of
the judge: State v. Keehn (1911)
85 Kan. 765, 118 Pac. 851; the de-
fendant may waive attendance at
the return of the verdict: State v.
Way (1907) 76 Kan. 928, 93 Pac.
159; the verdict in a capital case
may be returned after adjournment
of court: State v. McKinney (1884)
31 Kan. 570, 3 Pac. 356. Reasoning
from the above authorities the court
concludes that, in the absence of
statutory prohibition, the defendant
could certainly waive the presence
of one juror when the verdict,
reached by a full number, was re-
turned into court.
As to the ability of a jury to alter
a sealed verdict after it is arrived
at, it has been held in civil cases
that the jury may be allowed to cor-
rect or amend a sealed verdict, even
after sealing the verdict and separat-
ing: Bishop v. Mugler, supra; Por-
ret v. City of New York (1929) 252
N. Y. 208, 169 N. E. 280; Charles
v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1918) 230
Mass. 536, 120 N. E. 69; 66 A. L. R.
560-2 for other cases. However, the
rule is different in a criminal trial.
Where the jury have sealed their
verdict and separated, they cannot,
upon returning into court, amend or
correct it in a matter of substance:
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Williams v. People (1867) 44 Ill.
478; Sargeant v. State (1842) 11
Ohio St. 472; Koch v. State (1906)
126 Wis. 470, 106 N. W. 531; 66 A.
L. R. 571 for other cases. In hold-
ing that the verdict in the instant
case could not be altered after the
jury separated, and should have been
received, the Kansas court has fol-
lowed the holding of a majority of
state courts, while in holding that
the presence of the absent juror
could be waived, it recognizes that
the sealing of a verdict in a crim-
inal case ends the jury's considera-
tion in the matter, and that the re-
turn and reception of the verdict
are not judicial acts, but are pri-
marily ministerial in nature, and
may be waived as to strict con-
formity with statutory provisions:
1 Bishop "New Criminal Procedure"
(4th ed. 1895) §1001 and cases
cited. The court granted the writ of
habeas corpus as to the commitment
under the first indictment.
Under the second information the
defendant was charged with offenses
which could have been proved un-
der the former information and thus
a question of former jeopardy
arose. On this question the Kansas
courts have adopted the view of the
majority of jurisdictions. Jeopardy
is said to attach at the time "trial is
begun before a court of competent
jurisdiction upon an indictment or
information which is sufficient to
sustain a conviction": State v. Pitts-
burg Paving Brick Co. (1924) 117
Kan. 192, 230 Pac. 1035. Trial be-
gins after the defendant has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the
indictment, and after a competent
jury has been impanelled and sworn:
State v. Rook (1900) 61 Kan. 382,
59 Pac. 653; 16 C. J. 237 and cases
cited. The problem whichl faced
the court here was one of determin-
ing whether the offenses charged in
the warrant upon which the defend-
ant was bound over on January 23,
1934, were the same offenses for
which he was tried in November,
1933, for if they were, then defend-
ant's plea of former jeopardy bars
further prosecution: Kan. Const.,
Bill of Rights, §10; 8 R. C. L.
143; 16 C. J. 265. At the first trial
numerous acts and transactions were
testified to, any one of which would
have constituted the offenses charged
in the first count of the information,
which specified no particular date
other than "within two years last
prior to May 25, 1933." The Kan-
sas court has held that "where the
state has offered evidence tending
to prove several distinct and sub-
stantive offenses, it is the duty of
the court, upon the motion of the
defendant, to require the prosecutor,
before the defendant is put upon his
defense, to elect upon which par-
ticular transaction the prosecutor
will rely for a conviction": State v.
Crimmins (1884) 31 Kan. 376, 2
Pac. 574; State v. Schweiter (1882)
27 Kan. 500. When this election
has been made, proof of other of-
fenses, already in the record are
not proof of guilt, but merely of a
course of conduct, motive, etc.
Since this evidence was not proof
of guilt but merely proof of a course
of conduct it cannot he said that de-
fendant was in jeopardy for any
offense except that relied upon by
the state for conviction.
A verdict of acquittal of the
elected offense does not work an ac-
quittal of the other offenses charged
in the indictment: State v. Patter-
son (1928) 126 Kan. 770, 271 Pac.
390; State v. Learned (1906) 73
Kan. 328, 85 Pac. 233; State v.
Kuhuke (1883) 30 Kan. 462, 2 Pac.
689; State v. Shafer (1878) 20 Kan.
226. A state statute which provides
that a verdict- of not guilty imports
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an acquittal of every material al-
legation in the indictment alters the
rule: State v. Price (1905) 127
Iowa 301, 103 N. W. 195.
The defendant argued that had
each of the offenses charged been
placed in separate counts, then the
election of one count by the state
would have ended all further prose-
cution on the abandoned counts:
State v. Rush (1933) 138 Kan. 465,
26 Pac. (2d) 581. Thus he contends
that whether the offenses are
pleaded separately in different counts
or are combined in a single count
there should be no difference in re-
sult. Mr. Justice Smith in a dis-
senting opinion also argues that
there should be no difference, say-
ing that jeopardy attaches as soon
as the jury is sworn to try the case,
and that the defendant was in jeop-
ardy here for any crime of which
he could have been convicted under
the original information. His status
as to subsequent prosecutions was
fixed at the time the jury was sworn.
Undoubtedly this view is in strict
accord with the holding of tlfe Rook
case, supra, and if the majority of
the courts were not of the opinion
that a situation such as the one in
the instant case required an excep-
tion to be made, the defendant's con-
tention should be upheld. The dis-
tinction is a subtle one and it does
require some extension of the gen-
eral doctrine of jeopardy to uphold
it. The rule of election of offenses
was adopted for the benefit of the
accused. It gives him a definite idea
of what defense must be made,
rather than requiring to defend
against a number of charged of-
fenses which might vary as to time.
seriousness, and susceptibility of
proof. The fears of the dissent that
this will lead to abuse in that prose-
cutors may file charges on part of
the states' case, and so continue to
file informations until a conviction
is obtained, seems unfounded in
view of the fact that this policy has
been used in Kansas since 1907 when
it was approved in State v. Hibbard
(1907) 76 Kan. 376, 92 Pac. 304,
and no such abuse has been mani-
fested to date. This policy seems
to be reasonable and more helpful
to the accused than detrimental.
THOMAS M. BARGER, JR.
HOMICIDE - PERMISSIBLE DURA-
TION OF TIME BETWEEN INJURY AND
DEATH.-[New York] The defend-
ant was charged with the murder of
John Kennedy, a uniformed county
policeman. Although shot on July 22,
1928, the deceased did not die until
July 13, 1932, four years later. The
defendant argued that he was not
amenable to prosecution for murder
since the death occurred more than a
year and a day after the shot. This
argument being overruled, the de-
fendant was convicted in the lower
court. Held: on appeal, affirmed.
Under the modern statute a murder
indictment will lie although death
occurred more than a year and a
day after the assault: People v.
Brengard (1934) 265 N. Y. 100, 191
N. E. 850.
Though considerable time elapsed
betweer% the assault and the death,
there was no material conflict of
evidence as to the cause of the
death. The court, therefore, passed
rapidly over that point to discuss the
availability of the common law "year
and a day" rule. The result above
noted was reached by tracing the
history of the criminal law in New
York. It was found that the inten-
tion of the writers of the Code was
to do away with all common law
crimes and to define each crime
completely. Their object, as stated
by the commissioners, was "to bring
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within the compass of a single vol-
ume the whole body of the law of
crimes and punishments in force
within the State." The court further
said, "As long as the criminality of
acts is left to depend upon the un-
certain definitions or conflicting au-
thorities of the common law, uncer-
tainty must pervade our criminal
jurisprudence. . . . Killing is not
common law murder unless the vic-
tim dies within a year and a day.
According to common law defini-
tions, time is one of the elements.
Since the crime of murder as defined
with exactitude in the Penal Law
does not include any limitation as to
time, for a court to introduce any
limitation would be a defiance of
section 21 o.f this act, which directs
that it be construed 'according to
the fair import of (its) terms'."
This decision was supported by
People v. Legeri (1933) 239 App.
Div. 47, 266 N. Y. Supp. 86, a very
similar case. There the defendant
had been convicted of an assault,
and three years later when the vic-
tim died, he was indicted and con-
victed of first degree homicide. The
court there said that the definitions
of the nature of homicides in various
degrees were clearly set forth in de-
tail and do not include the "year
and a day" rule. The early statutes
made the quality of the act depend-
ent upon the length of time between
the blow and death, but the 1928
Revised Statutes included a general
repealing act. "When the legisla-
ture was compiling and consolidating
the laws with reference to crime, it
expressly repealed statutory rules
similar to the year and a day rule.
This indicates an intent to abrogate
that rule."
The Indiana court has taken the
opposite view in a case involving
the same facts and a statute similar
to that of New York. The court
there held that the word "murder"
had a definite and well defined mean-
ing in law long before the statute
was enacted, and that it logically fol-
lowed that the offense designated as
murder at common law is such under
the statute. They reasoned that the
legislature by its silence upon the
subject meant that the common law
rule of a year and a day should gov-
ern: State v. Dailey (1921) 191 Ind.
678, 134 N. E. 481. See also Epps
v. State (1885) 102 Ind. 539, 1 N. E.
491.
Many courts, in holding that it is
not necessary for the indictment to
allege the death as occurring within
a year and a day, appear to agree
with the New York decisions. Their
reasoning, in gerferal, is that the
year and a day rule is merely a rule
of evidence and not part of the def-
inition of the crime: People v. Mur-
phy (1870) 39 Cal. 52; Roberts v.
State (1915) 17 Ariz. 159, 149 Pac.
380. Contra: Commonwealth v.
Snell (1905) 189 Mass. 12, 75 N.
E. 75, 3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1019. These
courts practically all agree that the
victim must die within a year and
a day, but hold that it is not neces-
sary to allege it in those exact words
in the indictment. These cases
therefore should not be mistakenly
thought to be in accord with the
principal case.
The question is one of statutory
interpretation; that is whether or
not the statute should be considered
as complete in itself. Upon this
point the New York court is not
alone in its method of reasoning. In
Ross v. State (1908) 16 Wyo. 285,
9 Pac. 299, it was said, "The court
in construing a statute, defining an
offense by adding thereto elements
not found in the common law def-
inition, is not bound by the construc-
tion which obtained with reference
to the common law offense and
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where a statute creates and defines
a crime which is a substitute for a
common law offense, the rules apper-
taining to the latter, except in so
far as they are applicable, must yield
to the statutory rules of construc-
tion." State v. Benson (1927) 171
Minn. 292, 213 N. W. 910, holds that
where the statute defines a crime,
the statutory definition is to be ad-
hered to. In the state of Washing-
ton it was held that the offense of
bribery having been defined by the
-legislature, its act supersedes the
common law; and hence only the
elements of the crime as defined in
the statute need be alleged in the
indictment: State v. Benson (1927)
144 Wash. 170, 257 Pac. 236. For
an interesting note dealing with the
interpretation of a penal statute see
6 Tulane L. Rev. 135 (1931).
However, all of the authority is
not in accord on this question. A
number of states have abolished the
common law crimes and in their
place have substituted a code which
attempts to define the various crimes.
To discover the meaning of the def-
initions is often difficult. All codes
do not define the crimes; some of
them merely state that a certain of-
fense is a crime. Courts then gen-
erally hold that the common law
definition will be adopted. Stewart
v. State (1910) 4 Okla. Cr. 564, 109
Pac. 243, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 505,
was a case involving a disturbance
of the peace. The defendant
claimed that the statute was void
for uncertainty and that hence the
information was bad. The court
said, "It is true that there are no
common law crimes in this state but
nevertheless, when the legislature
creates, without defining, an offense
which was a crime under the com-
mon law, the common law definition
of the crime will be adopted." Peo-
ple V. Aro (1856) 6 Cal. 208; Dun-
nelle v. State (1919) 188 Ind. 373,
123 N. E. 689; Shires v. State (1909)
2 Okla. Cr. 89, 99 Pac. 1100; In Re
Green (C. C. Ohio, 1892) 52 Fed.
104; and United States v. Cardish
(D. C. Wis. 1906) 143 Fed. 640.
The reasoning in the instant case
with regard to construction of the
statute is supported by the presence
of a "catch-all" provision in the
Penal Code. Section 675 provides
that, "A person who wilfully and
wrongfully commits any act which
seriously injures the person or prop-
erty of another or which seriously
disturbs or endangers the public
peace or health, or which openly
outrages public decency, for which
no other punishment is expressly
prescribed by this code is guilty of
a misdemeanor." Thus the commis-
sioners in making their definitions
exclusive provided for a possible
omission by including a section un-
der which any common law crime
not otherwise covered in the code
might be prosecuted. The section
is a "catch-all" and a plain indica-
tion that the rest of the code is to
be construed strictly without refer-
ence to the common law: See Peo-
ple v. Most (1901) 36 Misc. 139,
73 N. Y. Supp. 220.
The original reason for the "year
and a day" rule was suitable to the
time of primitive medicine, but to-
day with modern medical skill the
cause of death can more readily and
accurately be determined. The rea-




setts] The defendants were charged
with maintaining a gaming nuisance;
i. e., premises "resorted to . . . and
. . . used for illegal gaming." The
game of "Beano" was conducted by
the defendants. Each player, upon
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payment of 10 cents, received a score
card with 5 horizontal and 5 vertical
rows of numbers, 4 feathered darts,
and a! number of beans. Five feet
before each player's position was a
target composed of one inch squares
numbered from one to ninety-nine.
The purpose of the game was to
pierce the numbers on the target
which corresponded to those num-
bers on the score card needed to win.
Prizes of $1.50 in merchandise were
offered to the player first making
"Beano," the covering of 5 num-
bers in a row with beans. If no
player made "Beano" with his own
darts-and this seldom happened-
the announcer would then call out
the numbers pierced by other play-
ers on their individual targets, and
the first player whose card showed
"five in a row" was declared winner.
Upon trial, and at the close of the
testimony the defendants asked for
an instruction stating that if the ele-
ment of skill is the dominant factor
in determining the winner in the
game of "Beano," then it is a game
of skill, and a verdict of not guilty
should be returned. The court, how.
ever, instructed the jury that the
playing of any game of chance or
skill on the issue of which the pay-
ment of money or property depends
is illegal gaming. It added that the
determining factor is not whether
the game is one of skill or chance
but rather whether the receipt of
money or a prize in any way de-
pends on the playing of that game.
In the lower court the defendants
were convicted. Held: on appeal,
affirmed. With regard to the facts
of this case the lower court's in-
struction on the question of skill was
correct: Commonwealth v. Theatre
Advertising Co. (Mass. 1934) 190
N. E. 518.
The earliest Massachusetts stat-
ute (Stat. of 1785, c. 58) had been
interpreted to regard all gaming for
money or other property as illegal
regardless of the skill involved:
Mason v. White (1822) 17 Mass.
560; Babcock v. Thompson (1825)
20 Mass. 446; White v. Buss (1849)
57 Mass. 448; Commonwealth v.
Gourdier (1860) 80 Mass. 390. By
the middle of the 19th century the
Massachusetts Court began to re-
vise its former attitude in regard to
illegal gaming. The necessity for
healthful and vigorous games with
prizes for the victor became appar-
ent, and the classification of all
games as illegal gaming was broken
down. The decisions came to recog-
nize as illegal gaming only those
devices or games that resulted in
victory or loss due to hazard or
chance: Commonwealth v. Taylor
(1860) 80 Mass. 26; Wilkinson v.
Stitt, supra; Murphy v. Rogers
(1890) 151 iMass. 118, 24 N. E. 35;
Commonwealth v. Ward (1932) 281
Mass. 119, 183 N. E. 271; Common-
wealth v. McClintock (1926) 257
Mass. 431, 154 N. E. 264. Thus it
was held that racing for a prize was
not against public policy since the
winning of the prize depended not
on some fortuitous circumstances
or accident but on the application
of skill.' Wilkinson v. Stitt (1900)
175 Mass. 581, 56 N. E. 830.
The trial court in the principal
case, evidently relying upon the rule
in White v. Buss, supra, failed to
consider the modification of the rule
as evidenced by the later Massachu-
setts decisions, and by other deci-
sions in this country and Canada:
City of Moberly v. Deskin (1913)
155 S. W. 842; Equitable Loan and
Security Co. v. Waring (1903) 117
Ga. 599, 44 S. E. 320; Mclnnis v.
State (1874) 51 Ala. 23; State v.
DeBoy (1895) 117 N. C. 702, 23 S.
E. 167; People ex rel. Ellison v.
Lavin (1904) 179 N. Y. 164, 71 N.
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E. 753; State v. Quaid (1891) 43 La.
Ann. 1076, 10 So. 183; State v.
Grimes (1892) 49 Minn. 443, 52 N.
W. 42; Portis v. State (1872) 27
Ark. 360; D'Orio v. Startup Candy
Co. (1928) 71 Utah 410, 266 Pac.
1037; D'Orio v. Jacobs (1929) 151
Wash. 297, 275 Pac. 563; State v.
Mint Vending Machine (1931) 85 N.
H. 22, 154 Atl. 224, Note (1931) 22
J. Crim. L. 282; In re Lee Tong
(D. C. Ore. 1883) 18 Fed. 253;
State v. Randall (1927) 121 Ore.
545, 256 Pac. 393; Swigart v; Peo-
ple (1895) 154 Ill. 284, 40 N. E.
432; People v. Monroe (1932) 349
Ill. 270, 182 N. E. 439; Rex v. Lang-
lois (1914) 2A Can. Cr. Cas. 43.
Writers on the subject of criminal
law have also recognized the change
in the rule: 2 Wharton "Criminal
Law" (11th ed. 1912) §1738. From
these authorities it would seem that
the case was sent to the jury on er-
roneous instructions and that the
instructions requested by the defend-
ants were a correct statement of the
law. But the court on appeal af-
firmed the lower court's ruling on
the instructions and attempted to
justify their holding by stating that
there was no evidence that "Beano"
was a game of skill and that the
correct rule was "inapplicable."
Thus the jury was not allowed
to determine whether this was a
game in which skill or chance pre-
dominated and this question was de-
termined adversely to the uelendants
by the appellate court from the
record. The only defense advanced
by the defendants was that this was
a game in which skill predominated,
a defense which is sufficient, under
the statute and modern decisions, if
proved. If the court sends the case
to a jury at all, it is reversible error
to take the defendant's defense from
their consideration. However, it
would not seem necessary to send
the question to the jury in a clear
case. A better method of handling
these cases would be to allow the
court to decide whether the given
game is lawful or not; Rex v. Hend-
rick (1921) 15 Cr. App. Rep. 149;
Rex v. Davies (1897) 2 Q. B. 199.
In the) event of a dispute of facts
the jury should be permitted to de-
termine whether the game is one ot
skill or of chance: Rex v. Hendrick,
supra. The court at this stage would
assist the jury with instructions that
clearly enunciated the law. This is
the view of the English courts but
this procedure would seem to be pos-
sible even under the usual Constitu-
tional guarantee in this country of
trial by jury in criminal offenses.
The numerous rules which come un-
der' the name of police regulations
need not be enforced by use of jury
trial: Frankfurter and Corcoran,
"Petty Federal Offenses and Trial
by Jury" (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev.
582. Under the common law many
minor offenses, including gambling,
were punishable by summary pro-
ceedings before a magistrate; and
this was true in Massachusetts.
To decide whether the game is one
of chance or of skill it is not neces-
sary to determine whether elements
of skill and judgment, or elements
of hazard and chance enter into the
final result; but whether by its char-
acter the game results in triumph
for the play by virtue of dominat-
ing factors of knowledge, strength,
ability or practice. The best in-
struction on this matter would fol-
low the rule of State v. Gupton
(1848) 30 N. C. 271. "A game of
chance is such a game as is de-
termined entirely or in part by lot
or mere luck, and in which judg-
ment, practice, skill or adroitness




CRIMINAL LAW - PLEA OF NON-
VuLT - ITs NATURE, EFFECT, AND
LIMITATIONS.- [New York] The
defendant was indicted and sen-
tenced to serve a term of not less
than three years nor more than ten,
for second degree forgery. While
the defendant was serving his term,
it was discovered that he had been
previously convicted in New Jersey
of defrauding a bank, upon an in-
dictment to which he had pleaded
non vult. The warden thereupon
sent him back for resentence as a
second offender. Con. Laws of
New York (Cahill 1930) c. 41, art.
174, §§1941-1943. The defendant
was adjudged a second offender by
the General Sessions Court and re-
ceived an additional sentence. The
Appellate Division reversed on the
grounds that the plea non vult fol-
lowed by judgment placing the de-
fendant on probation for 2 years
and payment of a fine of 25 cents
a day, was not a previous conviction
of a crime within the meaning of
the statute. Held: on appeal, re-
versed. Although the plea non vult
was not recognized by this state, its"
use in a prior case followed by judg-
ment is a prior conviction within
the meaning of the statute: People
v. Daiboch (1934) 265 N. Y. 125,
191 N. E. 859.
The above case suggests an in-'
quiry into the rules governing the
nature, effect, and limitations of the
plea non vult or nolo contendere,
as it is sometimes called. These
rules are not new to the American
law, being derivative of the ancient
commor law. The plea was recog-
nized by. many of the greatest Eng-
lish authorities of the eighteenth
century, the rules governing its use
being well settled at that early date.
In 2 Hawkins, "Pleas of the Crown"
8th Eng. ed. 1788, c. 31 p. 469 the
author sets out the common law rule:
"An implied confession is where a
defendant in a case not capital doth
not directly own himself guilty but
in a manner admits it by yielding to
the King's mercy, and desiring to
submit to a small fine; in which case
if the court thinks proper to accept
such submission, and make an entry
that defendant 'se posuit se in grat-
iam regis,' without putting him to a
direct confession, or plea, which in
such cases seems to be left to dis-
cretion, the defendant shall not be
estopped to plead not guilty to an
action for the same fact as he shall
be if the entry is 'quod cognovit in-
dicta mentum!" This rule was
given judicial recognition as early
as 1702: Regina v. Templeman
(1702) 1 Salk. 55. As the plea is
understood in the United States, it
is in substance an implied confes-
sion whereby the defendant refuses
to contend against the charges of
the indictment, but is content to
throw himself upon the mercy of the
court to inflict such punishment as it
decrees proper, usually less than the
amount assessable on a plea of
guilty: Tucker v. United States (C.
C. A. 7th, 1912) 196 Fed. 260; Stote
v. Hopkins (Del. 1913) 4 Boyce 306,
88 AtI. 473; Hocking Valley Rail-
way Co. v. United States (C. C. A.
6th, 1914) 210 Fed. 735. It should
be especially noted at this point that
the plea is not a general plea allow-
able to all criminal prosecutions, but
is allowable only on consent of the
court: Tucker v. United States,
supra; State v. Henson (1901) 66
N. J. Law 601, 50 Atl. 468; State
v. Martin (1915) 92 N. J. Law 436,
106 AtI. 385; Commonwealth v. In-
gersol. (1887) 145 Mass. 381, 14
N. E. 445. For the purposes of the
case at hand when accepted by the
court it is equivalent to a plea of
guilty: State v. Siddall (1907) 103
Me. 144, 68 Atl. 634; Tucker v.
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United States, supra. As in all cases
where the court is allowed to ex-
ercise a discretion, the higher courts
will not inquire into the propriety
of its acceptance unless a gross
abuse of that discretion is discern-
ible: State v. Martin, supra.
The next question which presents
itself involves the effect of the use
of this plea upon the rights of the
defendant. Generally, when ac-
cepted, the 1lea non vult cannot be
withdrawn except by consent of the
court: State v. Siddall, supra. In the
absence of statute to the contrary,
by its use the defendant waives all
formal defects in the proceedings
which he could have attacked on a
plea to the merits, abatement, or
motion to quash: State v. Alderman
(1911) 81 N. J. Law 549, 79 Ati.
283; Commonwealth v. Hinds (1868)
101 Mass. 209; United States v. Nor-
.ris (1930) 281 U. S. 619, 50 S. Ct.
424. But the defendant is not es-
topped from testing the question,
whether the indictment charges an
offense, as he could have done on a
writ of error aftcr a plea of guilty:
Hocking Valley Railway Co. v.
United States, supra. Thus it fol-
lows that when the defendant enters
a plea of non vult and it is accepted
by the court, to all intents and pur-
poses the defendant has pleaded
guilty and sentence follows as a
matter of course: Tucker v. United
States, supra. Although it is al-
ways permissible for a defendaft
after a plea of guilty to testify him-
self and to introduce witnesses in
mitigation of punishment, no author-
ity can be found giving this right to
the defendant after a plea of ton
nilt. It seems unquestionable, how-
ever, that the defendant might take
the stand in his own behalf under
any circumstances. When judgment
is entered on the plea the record is
competent evidence of the fact of
conviction, although unlike the con-
viction on a plea of guilty, it cannot
be used against the defendant in any
subsequent civil suit based upon the
same act. State v. Henson, supra;
State v. Herlihy (1906), 102 Me.
310, 66 Atl. 643; State v. Radoff
(1926) 140 Wash. 202, 248 Pac.
405; United States v. Lair (C. C.
A. 8th, 1912) 195 Fed. 47; Tucker
v. United States, supra.
In the same manner that the rules
regarding the nature and effect of
the plea of non vult were borrowed
from the common law, certain dis-
tinctions as to limitations upon its
use, recognized by the common law,
are also given great weight in this
country. All of our states with the
exception of Illinois, Indiana, New
York, and Minnesota, recognize the
place of the plea in criminal cases,
but the courts differ as to the class
of criminal cases to which it will
apply: People v. Miller (1914) 264
IIl. 148, 106 N. E. 191; Mahoney v.
State (1925) 197 Ind. 335, 149 N.
E. 444; People v. Daiboch (1934)
265 N. Y. 125, 191 N. E. 859 (dic-
tun) ; State v. Kiewel (1926) 166
Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 646. It is
universally held that the plea non
wlt cannot be accepted in cases of
felonies requiring infamous punish-
ment or life imprisonment: Com-
monwealth v. Schrope (1919) 264
Pa. 246, 107 Atl. 729; 2 Bishop,
"New Criminal Law Procedure"
(2d ed. 1913) § 802. Under the
common law rule, which governs in
the federal courts, to authorize a
tribunal to entertain the plea the
case must fall into that class of
misdemeanors punishable by fine
alone; and is not allowed in cases of
misdemeanors where punishment by
imprisonment is mandatory. It may
be allowed, however, where im-
prisonment may be assessed, in the
discretion of the court either as an
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alternative of fine, or in addition
thereto, or to enforce the payment
of the fine: Tucker v. United
State, supra; Shapiro v. United
States (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) 196
Fed. 268; Blum v. United States (C.
C. A. 7th, 1912) 196 Fed. 269. The
courts in the foregoing cases rea-
son that such a limitation existed
at common law, and since we have
no statute to the contrary, the courts
in this country are bound to en-
force it. The positions of the vari-
pus state courts on this question are
extremely varied and of little en-
lightenment as to the most desirable
bounds of limitation on the use of
the plea. Some state courts impose
a fine only without discussing the
problem at all; while others, in cases
where fine and imprisonment are
provided for, will impose only a
fine: Young v. People (1912) 53
Col. 251, 125 Pac. 117; Williams v.
State (1923) 130 Miss. 827, 94 So.
882. The majority of the state
court decisions impose imprisonment
on the plea without discussing the
matter: Commonwealth v. Holstine
(1890) 132 Pa. 357, 9 At. 273; State
ex rel. Peacock v. Judqes (1884) 46
N. J. Law 112; State v. Burnett
(1917) 174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473;
Commonwealth v. Ferguson (1910)
44 Pa. Super. Ct. 626. In a relatively
recent case the United States Su-
preme Court vigorously attacked the
decision laid down in the Tucker
Case, saying that the historical back-
ground of the common law was too
meager to substantiate any belief
that such a limitation existed. Hud-
son v. United States (1926) 272 U.
S. 451, 47 S. Ct. 127. It went on
to say that "whereas the court may
in its discretion mitigate the punish-
ment in case of a plea non vlt, and
may feel constrained to do so when-
ever the plea is accepted with the
understanding that a fine only would
be imposed, but such restriction is
not mandatory upon the court." Be-
cause of the noticeable scarcity of
cases dealing with the subject,
coupled with the utter lack of dis-
cussion in the decisions as to the
advantages or disadvantages of hold-
ing one way or another, it is prac-
tically impossible to measure the
merits of the positions of the various
courts.
The plea has a distinctly bene-
ficial use in those cases where
the facts upon which the action
is based might at the same time
operate to render the defendant li-
able to a civil as well as a criminal
action. By using the plea in the
criminal action the defendant has a
chance of mitigating his sentence
and at the same time precludes an
estoppel from pleading his innocence
in a subsequent civil suit. This
would not be possible under a plea
of guilty. In all other respects the
pleas are of similar nature and ef-
fect. However, it is interesting to
note that if the policy of Justice
White's opinion in the Hudson case
(supra) is followed by the courts
generally, we can look for a- radical
loosening of the old common law
limitations, and may expect a de-
cided increase in the popularity of
the plea.
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